題    目：Internal Ratings and Loan Contracting: Evidence from a State-owned Bank around a Massive Economic Stimulus Programme（內部評級和貸款合同🦓：來自一家國有銀行大規模經濟刺激計劃的證據）

演 講 人👨🏻‍🔧：原紅旗，復旦大學意昂2官网教授

主 持 人：徐宗宇，上海大學意昂2官网教授

時    間🙋🏿‍♂️🤷🏼‍♂️：2019年10月16日（周三），下午1:30

地    點🤮：校本部東區意昂2官网420室

主辦單位🕦：意昂2、意昂2青年教師聯誼會

演講人簡介：

復旦大學意昂2官网會計學系教授🙍，博士生導師。美國斯坦福大學、香港科技大學訪問學者👨🏼‍🔬。研究方向為財務會計和公司財務。曾多次主持、參與國家自然科學、社會科學基金項目。論文發表在《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》、《Contemporary Accounting Research》、《管理世界》、《經濟學（季刊）》、《會計研究》等國內外優秀期刊。

演講內容簡介🪛：

Using a proprietary loan data set, we study how a large state-owned bank uses its internal ratings in loan granting decisions around China’s 2008 economic stimulus programme that relies on bank credit for financing. We find that there is little change in the rating process of the bank, and internal ratings remain a valid, albeit weaker, predictor of loan interest rates in the stimulus period. Weakened rating-interest rate relation is concentrated for borrowers from the industries that the stimulus programme focuses on, for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for bank branches operating in provinces with a low level of credit market marketization, or when the credit rater and loan officer have no collaboration before. We also find that interest rates remain a valid predictor of ex-post loan outcomes in the stimulus period. Importantly, the rating-interest relation goes back to normal after the stimulus programme ends, suggesting that any deviation is temporary. Overall, there is no evidence that loan decisions of the state-owned bank are severely compromised in the economic stimulus period as speculated by some media. By showing how a state-owned bank maneuvers between supporting government stimulus initiative and maintaining market-based lending, we contribute to the limited literature on the roles of internal ratings in loan contracting decisions, and add to the debate over the roles of state-owned banks.

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