題    目：Does Advance Price Announcement Facilitate Tacit Collusion in Liner Shipping?（承運人發布的提價聲明可否促成價格共謀？）

演 講 人🙆🏻‍♂️：陳剛教授，上海海事大學—中國（上海）自貿區供應鏈研究院

主 持 人：鎮璐教授，意昂2

時    間🫅🏽🔏：2019年5月9日（周四）上午10:00-11:00

地    點：校本部東區意昂2官网實477室

主辦單位：意昂2、意昂2青年教師聯誼會

演講人簡介🙍🏿‍♂️：

    陳剛🏂🏻，上海海事大學—中國（上海）自貿區供應鏈研究院，教授。曾求學於大連海事大學和南丹麥大學，分別獲得國際航運管理學士學位和物流管理博士學位🧜🏻‍♂️。2012年起在（丹麥）奧爾堡大學任助理教授，2015年晉升為終身副教授💪🏿。2018年底入職上海海事大學。研究方向包括集裝箱作業系統研究🐹🎵、船隊能效管理、航運數字化🫚、航運定價與競爭等等。與北歐多家航運企業有緊密的研究合作👨🏿‍⚕️，包括馬士基航運、Torm🫳🏼、Lauritzen，Vessel Performance Solution等🚫，承擔或參與多個丹麥和歐盟的航運研究項目。其科研成果獲得國際上的認可，包括在2009年國際海運學家年會上榮獲最佳會議論文獎⛰，在2010年世界物流與海運系統年會上獲得最佳學生論文獎🥮。目前擔任Journal of Navigation的副主編，以及多個國際期刊的客座編輯👮🏿，包括Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review，Annals of Operations Research🪤，Simulation等等。

演講內容簡介：

    In ocean shipping, container carriers often use ‘general rate increase’ (GRI) announcements through public channels to signal to customers an intended price increase. Typically, the announcements are made almost simultaneously by several carriers, with a similar price increase amount and the same implementation date. This practice has caught the attention of market governance authorities such as the European Commission, who suspect it facilitates tacit price collusion among competing carriers. To provide a theoretical reference for relevant authorities, several key questions have to be addressed, such as: 1) How a carrier reacts to another’s GRI at the announcement stage; 2) when a set of GRIs are announced, how much collusion will be generated if market conditions remain the same over time; and 3) if the market conditions change over time, how can a carrier predict it and what will the impact be on the first two questions? To begin with, this paper addresses the middle question, by presenting a GRI game model based on a Bertrand competition model and a withdrawal option feature. The proposed model captures the relationships between GRI outcome and certain influencing factors, such as competition intensity, the number of participating carriers, and the time that elapses before silent withdrawal means discovered by competitors etc. This analysis demonstrates that in limited market conditions GRI could allow tacit collusion, pushing the price higher than the Bertrand equilibrium. Through validation in selected historical cases, this model shows significant explanatory power for potential collusion enabled by GRI. It sets a basic understanding of GRI-like advance price announcement; and when the other research questions are addressed, their integration will provide solid theoretical reference for constructive dialogue between authorities and carriers on market regulation in the future.

歡迎廣大師生參加！